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Abstract
Electronic auctions can be applied in certain health care markets, but the effects on
market structure, market behavior and market performance are unclear. We analyzed the
effects of a reverse electronic auction initiative that was implemented by a new
intermediary (CareAuction.nl) in the market for maternity care in the Netherlands in
2005 and 2006. We found small but significant effects on the price of maternity care
(minus 2-4%), and significant effects on market structure (more care providers involved
in the bidding processes) and market behavior (bidding behaviors and user preferences).
We see good opportunities to improve health care market effectiveness for specific care
services (non-emergency, elective, standardized care) and to further adapt the auction
mechanism.

Keywords: Auction, Health Care, Market Performance, Intermediation

1 Introduction
The health care sector is a large industry in many Western countries. For instance, health
care expenditures in the US economy are nearly two trillion dollars per year (Smith et al.,
2006). Markets play an important role in the delivery and financing of health care in the
US (Gaynor, 2005) and UK (Propper, 2003). Market-oriented healthcare reforms are
being considered or enacted by many countries where policymakers have to decide on
reforms and regulation, including competition law, while courts and competition
regulators have to make decisions about firms in health care markets (Gaynor, 2005). A
key reform objective in the European health-care systems over the last two decades has
been to make the health-care system more demand-oriented (Kerzman et al, 2003).
Health care markets exist between users of care (patients or clients), providers of care
(e.g., doctors and hospitals), and purchasers of care (e.g., insurance companies) (Propper,
2003). Auctions might play a positive role in matching the demand and offering of care in
these markets, offering opportunities to address the vexing concern of ever increasing
health care costs and keeping these costs under some control. The electronic auction
mechanism might serve as a potential solution in national health care policy dilemma‟s.
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CareAuction.nl (in Dutch: Zorgveiling.nl) is a recent private initiative in the maternity
care sector in the Netherlands: about 30% of all maternity care was contracted through
CareAuction.nl by the end of 2006. CareAuction.nl has changed the market relationship
between care providers and insurance companies in two distinct ways. First,
CareAuction.nl is based on individual transactions for each customer requesting maternity
care, in stead of contracting the total volume of maternity care per year in one contract
per provider. Second, CareAuction.nl enables an electronic auction process where
multiple providers can bid on one customer request.
In this paper, we analyze the influence of the auction principle and more specifically, the
electronic auction, on health care markets. Our aim is to assess if and how auctions can
help to improve health care systems. Our research method consists of a critical
retrospective analysis of one case, based on structured interviews with different actors
involved in the changing care market, experiencing the effects of the electronic auction
system (Klein and Myers, 1999).
We first review auction mechanisms, compare these to the tender system and
negotiations, and introduce the model by Sheperd (1985) to analyze effects of external
determinants (like electronic auctions) on market structure, market behavior, and market
performance (section 2). The research approach is given in section 3. Sections 4 and 5
present the analysis of the effects of CareAuction on the maternity care market in the
Netherlands using the Shepherd model. Conclusions are given in section 6.

2 Auctions, Tenders, Negotiations, and Markets
A standard or non-Web auction has been defined as „„a market institution with an explicit
set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the
market participants‟‟ (McAffee and McMillan, 1987). The buyers (bidders) in the auction
determine the price for the resource (product or service) and the seller determines the
rules of the auction. In contrast, in a „reverse auction‟, the sellers of a good of service
determine the price and the buyers determine the rules of the auction.
Auctions take more time to execute than market transactions based on fixed prices, but
are faster than negotiations, where every bid and re-bid have to be evaluated.
Negotiations go on until the parties reach agreement. Bidders in an auction continue
bidding until no bidder wants to bid a higher price and „wins the auction‟ if this price is at
least better than a threshold or minimum price („reserve price‟) (Bulow and Klemperer,
1996). The differences between auctions and negotiations are also visible in web sites as
www.ebay.com and www.marktplaats.nl. On eBay, buyers bid until the highest bid wins
the auction, and the winning bidder has the obligation to buy the product for the winning
price. Winning the auction on Marktplaats does not mean that the bidder has the
obligation to buy, but the seller is informed that someone is interested in the product, after
which negotiations can start.
Tenders and auctions are related mechanisms. Since 2004, the European Union allows the
use of electronic auctions to call for tenders (EU, 2004). Before the auction is started, the
auctioning firm has issued a call for tender, has evaluated all tender proposals and has
invited the bidders that meet the criteria to the auction (Plattel, 2006).

2.1 Auction mechanisms
Basically, an auction is a market mechanism to match supply and demand of a specific
product or service, where one or more customers (bidders) meet one or more suppliers
(Van Heck and Ribbers, 1998). The auction mechanism defines whether bids will be (i)
increasing or decreasing, (ii) simultaneous or sequential, and (iii) open or closed. Also,
the mechanism determines when and how the auction stops, how bids are compared, how
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the price is determined, and how the goods are allocated to the winning bidders (Sashi
and O‟Leary, 2002).
The standard auction mechanism is the English auction or the Ascending Price auction, as
described above. The seller starts the bidding at a minimally acceptable point usually
called the reserve price and the buyers bid higher and higher until no one is willing to go
any higher. The buyer with the highest bid wins the item. Another commonly used
auction format is the Dutch auction where bids don‟t rise, but decrease. The seller offers a
product against a high price, and lowers the price until one buyer accepts the price (by
saying „mine‟). When this mechanism is used to sell multiple items of the same article,
this is referred to as a „discriminatory price auction‟. In this auction mechanism, bids are
sorted from high to low and the items are allocated to the highest bids until no item is left.
Other single item auction types („Vickrey auctions‟) are characterized by the rules to
choose the winning bid: „first price auctions‟ (best bid wins the auction) and „second
price auctions‟ (second best bid wins). A special auction mechanism is the „reverse
auction‟ where the buyer „„controls‟‟ the market because an item is being requested that
is offered by a number of sellers. The price offered by the sellers continues to decrease
until a theoretical rational market price is achieved and the (single) buyer accepts the bid
of one of the sellers (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003).

2.2 Effects of Auctions on Markets
Markets are not primarily economic allocation mechanisms but also social institutions
that facilitate exchange of goods or services by means of competition (Shepherd, 1985;
Koppius, 2002). Auctions and, more specifically the auction mechanisms (the „design of
the auction processes) can have various significant effects on markets (see e.g. Kambil
and Van Heck 1995, Van Heck and Ribbers, 1998; Sashi and O‟Leary, 2002).
In this paper we use the model by Shepherd (1985) (Figure 1) to analyze the effects of
auctions on market structure (MS), market behavior (MB), and market performance
(MP). Shepherd distinguishes four factors: MS, MB, MP and external determinants (ED),
where MS influences MB, and MS and MB influence MP. Additionally, there is
„feedback‟ influence since MB influences MS and MP influences MB and MS.
Additionally, MS, MB, and MP are influenced by ED (e.g., demand elasticity, learning
processes, and government policies).

Market

External
Determinants

Market
Structure

(e.g.,
demand elasticity,
Learning processes,

Market
Performance

Auction mechanism,
Government policies)

Market
Behavior

Figure 1. External determinants influence Market Structure, Behavior and Performance
(based on Shepherd, 1985)

Examples of the effects of auctions on market structure are (i) emergence of intermediary
organizations that provide bidding information services to buyers or sellers, and (ii) rules
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that enforces buyers to be in a specific (virtual or real) bidding room to join the bidding.
These effects can cause auction costs (an indicator of market performance) to increase,
thereby creating an entry-barrier for auction participation (market behavior) (Kambil and
Van Heck, 1995). Auctions can also affect market behavior if, for instance, buyers can
observe the bidding behavior of other buyers (in an auction room) and use the
information in the bidding strategy. Similarly, buyers in electronic auctions can exchange
information outside the auction system (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003).
Auctions can have various effects on market performance. Reverse auctions tend to lead
to lower prices and faster transactions if compared to the standard Request for Quote
(RFQ) used in industrial markets. In a RFQ, sellers make bids on a request by a buyer
(Smeltzer and Carr, 2003). Bulow and Kemperer (1996) showed that English auctions
results in the lowest prices and Kambil and Van Heck (1995) showed that the Dutch
auction results in many transactions per hour (also due to the high bidding speed,
enforced by the bidding clock) and can result in higher prices.

2.3 Electronic Auctions and Electronic Markets
The previous section summarized effects of classical (non-electronic) auctions on
classical (non-electronic) markets. Electronic markets are defined as inter-organizational
information systems that allow the participating buyers and sellers to exchange
information about prices and product offerings. An electronic auction brings the buyers
and sellers together via some type of electronic media, usually the Internet (Van Heck and
Ribbers, 1998). More specifically, the European Union defines an electronic auction for
tenders as “a repetitive process involving an electronic device for the presentation of new
prices, revised downwards, and/or new values concerning certain elements of tenders,
which occurs after an initial full evaluation of the tenders, enabling them to be ranked
using automatic evaluation methods” (EU, 2004).
Unlike classical auctions, electronic auctions facilitate the use of multiple criteria
simultaneously to evaluate bids, meaning that the auctioneer can aim to reach the best
possible price, quality, delivery time, continuity of services, and other performance
indicators in one auction (Van Heck and Ribbers, 1997; Hakamis et al, 2003).
Electronic auctions affect the market structure because they can influence the number of
market participants: numbers can increase when market accessibility improves and
numbers might decrease if high (IT) investment are needed for market participants (entry
and exit barriers). Market behavior can be influenced because more market information
can be made available to all or some market participants (information (a-) symmetry), and
because multiple transactions can be used to exchange smaller batches, for specific buyer
groups, either sequentially or simultaneously. Market performance can be influenced
because electronic auctions can lead to lower transaction costs, more transactions per
hour, and more complex transactions can be executed because of the use of auctionrobots (Pinker et al, 2003).
Electronic markets can influence the products, because the smaller batch sizes enable
more product varieties (in price and qualities) and more customization. On the other hand,
high asset specificity (the product is only useful for a small customer group) hinders the
market to function well, because complex product descriptions require more
communication and information exchange, thus incurring higher market costs and higher
preferences for direct contacts between buyer and seller (Malone et al, 1987)

2.4 Auctions and Markets in Health Care
Auctions are relatively unknown in health care. Some initiatives that resemble
CareAuction.nl are www.medicineonline.com where the reverse auction mechanism is
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used for cosmetic surgery services. Patients (customers) can put their request for surgery
online and surgeons bid by listing a price and quality indicators such as their educational
background, experience, and surgical facilities. Other examples of auctions in health care
are related to non-treatment activities, such as a Dutch hospital that uses an auction to
outsource sterilization services (achieving 30% cost reduction), or a group of hospitals
that outsource their copying services, or hospitals that use auctions to purchase office
supplies and surgical gloves (www.nvilg.nl 2003, 2004).

3 Research Approach
Electronic markets can be evaluated from many perspectives. Driedonks et al (2005)
distinguish between five types of electronic markets research.
Analysis of the development of a market over time: changes in structures, roles,
and functions of intermediaries (the „institutional view‟ on markets),
Analysis of (electronic) markets in comparison to other (electronic) coordination
mechanisms for demand and supply of products or services,
Analysis of differences between processes in electronic and non-electronic
markets and the effects on market performance (e.g. price formation),
Analysis of factors that drive or hinder adoption and development of successful
market systems,
Case analysis of successes and failures of electronic markets.
Our research combines the first two types of research: we analyzed the developments of
the market for maternity care services over a period of 1.5 year (2005-2006) since the
introduction of a new intermediary „CareAuction.nl‟ and the simultaneous introduction
electronic auction mechanism in March 2005.
We adopted a qualitative case-based research approach, which has been suggested as
appropriate research strategy to separate a phenomenon (market performance) from its
context (market context, structure, and behavior) (Yin, 1994). Our research data are (i)
the CareAuction usage statistics (made available for us in the CareAuction transaction
databases), (ii) background materials being the NIVEL report with an analysis of the
maternity care sector (Lamkaddam and Wiegers, 2004), the analysis of the CareAuction
application by the Dutch Government (Zorgautoriteit, October 2006), and (iii) face to
face interviews with care providers (four CEOs of maternity care organizations), care
purchasers (two senior managers in two large health insurance companies that purchase
maternity care for their clients), and the CEO of CareAuction.nl. Each interview took
about 90 minutes and was based on a set of open questions on changes in:
Market structure. Example questions are “which market participants were
involved” and “how were demand and supply matched”, “what is the role of
patients?” before and after using CareAuction; (how) did the relations change
between care providers and insurance companies? Did market transparency and
accessibility change and improve?” ,
Market behavior. Example questions are “has CareAuction influenced your
business operations? How do you evaluate the performance of CareAuction?
Does CareAuction offer sufficient opportunities to show your specific product or
service? Are you satisfied with its current quality evaluation system? Why did
you choose to use CareAuction? How do customers (patients) receive the
benefits (lower costs) of CareAuction? How many customers (patients) know
that CareAuction is used to purchase their care?”
Market performance. Example questions are “how much time (costs) is needed
to use CareAuction (and is this more or less than before)? What are the (dis-)
advantages of using CareAuction? Did you experience advantages of using
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CareAuction (improved productivity of available care resources? Less
paperwork? Easy contracting?), Did CareAuction improve your power position?

4 Case Description of CareAuction
4.1 Introduction
CareAuction is a private initiative and a small (8 fte) privately owned (dotcom) company
aiming to enable Internet based auctions for care and care related products and services.
The Internet application (www.zorgveiling.nl) was developed since 2003 and the
application is used since March 2005 by two large health insurance companies in the
Netherlands (Achmea and Menzis) to purchase maternity care services for their clients
(patients). The total number of births is about 200,000 per year in the Netherlands (CBSStatline) of which Achmea and Menzis contract about 50%. Achmea and Menzis decided
not to buy all maternity care through CareAuction, but only the care needed in the
peripheries of their business areas, which is a total of about 15,000 births per year. The
core areas were still serviced by using bulk contracting per year, meaning a fixed price
(per hour) equal to the maximum tariff as determined by the Dutch government.
The essence of the CareAuction procedure is that insured customers (or clients or
patients) report their needs for maternity care services to their insurance company,
normally 5-6 months before the birth is to be expected. The insurance company enters the
need (demand) into the CareAuction web-application, and specifies the amount of
maternity care hours in a specific period (immediately after the expected birth date), in a
certain postal code area. The care providers that have a contract with the insurance
company are contractually bound to make a bid on each request. The auction ends after
three or five days and the best bid gets the contract. The best bid is determined as having
the lowest price, or the best quality of care, or the care provider preferred by the client
(see below for a detailed description of the auction mechanism). Standard maternity care
typically consists of 44 hours of home care, divided over five days for a total tariff of
1522 Euro. Each bid by a care provider consists of a reduction of the hourly tariff (34.60
Euro, excluding the additional payment by the patient).
Currently, CareAuction is only used for part of the maternity care volume. CareAuction
aims to expand the volume and to extend its intermediary services to other types of care.
Originally, CareAuction was intended to increase the power of patients, helping them to
influence care services, to increase customization, competition, and quality of services. In
Figure 2, this would mean that CareAuction would be positioned in the care market
between care providers and patients. Since this positioning resulted in too many dispersed
customers and a high administrative load for the CareAuction organization, CareAuction
decided to position itself in the care contracting market between insurance companies and
care providers. Actually, in 2006, CareAuction offered a variety of tools (robots) to
insurance companies and care providers, facilitating the business to business market.
In this way, CareAuction has deployed IT to change the purchasing processes of
insurance companies. Contracts with care providers are no longer made once per year per
provider (stating the yearly volumes and prices of care), but contracts are made 200 days
per year, individually, now about 15,000 care services per year, varying in price and
volume.
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Care Contracting Market
Insurance
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Allocation
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Auction
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Figure 1: The position of CareAuction as intermediary in the three health care markets. (the dotted
arrow illustrates the repositioning of CareAuction between 2004 and 2006)

4.2 The auction mechanism and process
The auction process consists of three stages: the care request stage, the bidding stage, and
the care allocation stage. The request stage for maternity care starts when the patient
(client) contacts the call center of the insurance company (note that also clients that
contact a care provider must be referred to the insurance company). The request is
specified and entered into the CareAuction web application. Clients can select one or two
preferred care providers, to be chosen out of the providers that are contracted in their
region. Clients can also indicate providers that they do not want (negative preferences)
(Hoeksema et al, 2006).
The care request is auctioned using the reverse auction mechanism. Before accepting the
request, CareAuction checks the completeness. After checking all request of that day,
CareAuction releases the request to the Auction at midnight. Care providers must make
their bids within five days (Achmea) or three days (Menzis). Care providers have the
right to bid on each request, but bidding implies that the provider must deliver care if the
bid wins the auction. The start tariff equals the maximum hourly tariff, as determined
yearly by the government. The minimum bid is 10 euro (Achmea) or 5 euro (Menzis) on
the total number of hours requested. Care providers can use a bidding robot („autobod‟)
who follows the bidding process and raises a bid in steps of 5 euro (or another step size,
determined by the provider) until a maximum bid has been reached (to be determined by
the provider). Also, a maximum bid is determined by the insurance company to ensure a
minimum quality level.
Care allocation is not done manually by the insurance companies, but by a robot that
allocates care to the best bid. The care request is allocated to the bid hat was done by the
care provider of choice, even if this bid is not the lowest price. In case the client has not
listed any provider preferences, then the provider with the highest quality ranking is
selected (the quality system is based on client satisfaction ratings, but was not (yet)
operational in our test period). If customer preference and quality scores do not result in a
match, then the third criterion is used and care is allocated to the best price (the lowest
total price). If more providers have bid the same price then a random choice is made.
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After the allocation has been made, the insurance company and the winning care provider
automatically receive an email listing the terms and details of the agreement. Clients and
insurance companies do not pay for CareAuction intermediary services. Care providers
pay a fixed fee per contract (19,50 Euro) to CareAuction (bills for these transaction costs
are sent automatically by the CareAuction application to the care provider). After the care
has been delivered, CareAuction sends an evaluation form to the client, which forms the
basis for the quality system.

4.3 Portal functionality
The CareAuction portal offers specific functionalities to two distinct groups. Users enter
the home page and have to login as a care provider or as an insurance company. The
auction services are for members only. In the test period (2005-2006) the only members
were two insurance companies and 155 care providers (being only the care providers that
are contracted by the two insurance organizations).
Typical functionalities are (i) the filtering and sorting of care requests, bids, and
contracts, (ii) bidding robots, (iii) automatic messaging to alert bidders on new bids by
competitors, (iv) news updates and news letters. One insurance company uses the
automatic billing functionality; the other company uses manual conversion of data
between the CareAuction application and the internal IT systems. No automatic billing
facilities or digital interfacing are offered to care providers. Some efforts have been made
to improve electronic data interchange but this has stopped because of high costs and lack
of standards.

5 Analysis of market effects by CareAuction
The introduction of CareAuction in 2005 has resulted in the emergence of an electronic
health care market for maternity care in the Netherlands. An electronic market in the form
of an inter-organizational information system (IOS), deployed to connect multiple buyers
and sellers, and to support their interactions in order to identify, to select, and to execute
transactions (Van Heck and Ribbers, 1998). Also, the IOS is used to exchange
information on prices products and the IOS is maintained and developed by an
intermediary (Choudhury et al, 1998).

5.1 Effects on Market structure
Market participants. Two large insurance companies (their combined market share is
about 50% of all maternity care in the Netherlands) and about 160 care providers (out of a
total of about 220 in the Netherlands) participate in CareAuction. About 200,000 clients
request maternity care per year, with an average of 12,000 to 20,000 requests per month.
A care provider can have contracts with multiple insurance companies and an insurance
company can contract multiple care providers. Insurance companies can use „preferred
suppliers‟ to deliver all maternity care to the clients in the core geographical areas of the
insurance companies. For care outside this area, insurance companies in the Netherlands
can use „care brokers‟ (such as LTZ and ZUN for maternity care). Care providers are the
organizations that actually deliver (maternity) care. Care brokers are intermediaries in the
care contracting market that resell care to insurance companies. Before 2005, 65% of all
care requests were allocated to the preferred supplier and 35% were allocated through
brokers. With the introduction of CareAuction the care broker activities can be bypassed.
In 2005, CareAuction was used for 7% of all requests, to some extent by bypassing the
brokers. In 2006, CareAuction did 20% of all requests. Care request in the periphery
regions are done by bypassing the brokers.
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Accessibility. Accessibility of the market has improved after the introduction of
CareAuction, because insurance companies can contact more care providers, and care
providers can now bid on each request, in stead of simply waiting for being allocated to a
request by an insurance company or a broker. Although CareAuction has improved
accessibility and openness of the care market to some extent (the insurance companies
allow more care providers to participate in the electronic biddings than before the
introduction of CareAuction), the market remains relatively closed because care providers
can only participate after they have been accepted as member of the bidding community
by an insurance company.
Products. The maternity care market is a homogeneous market with a low product
variety. The standard product consists of home care of mother and child and some
housekeeping, with some variety in the amount of hours (40) and days (5). Care Auction
has not affected product variety but insurance companies and care providers expect some
changes in the (near) future to allow for more customized care, also because maternity
care might be combined with other home care services.
Transparency. CareAuction has increased market transparency for care providers.
Before the introduction of CareAuction, each request for care was allocated (and made
visible) to only one care provider without providing information about these requests to
other care providers. With CareAuction, all providers can see which care requests are
made in which region (postal codes) and periods. On the other hand, care providers can
only bid on care requests based on information on region and period. Care providers tend
to see this as problematic.

5.2 Effects on Market Behavior
Preferences. In the early weeks of CareAuction between March and July 2005, 61% to
67% of the care requests included a preferred supplier. In July 2005, this percentage
suddenly jumped to 81% to 87% until the end of the test phase (February 2006). This
jump is explained by care providers stating that they have instructed their clients to add a
preferred supplier to the request to their insurance companies. Apparently, clients have
followed this advice.
Bidding behavior. Per auction, eight care providers (average number in 2006) participate
in the bidding. In July 2005, the average bid (AB) by care providers on CareAuction was
11.7%, meaning that they offered care for a price of 11.7% below the normal (maximum)
tariff. The average winning bid (AWB) was 4.3%. The difference is due to clients that
indicated a preferred supplier. In January 2006, AB had decreased to 10.2% and AWB
had decreased to 2.6%. This strong reduction of AWB was not due to an increase of the
indications for preferred suppliers (87% in July 2005 and 82% in January 2006).
Apparently, the preferred suppliers made lower bids in January 2006.
Drivers for using CareAuction. The insurance companies indicate that they decided to
use CareAuction because it provides opportunities for allocating care to preferred
suppliers, to achieve better prices, and to introduce a system to assess customer
satisfaction. Three out of four care providers do not regard CareAuction to be a success:
they see it as a cost factor and an administrative burden and are not satisfied with the
auction system. However, the volume of care requested through CareAuction is so high
(up to 30% market share) that care providers simply cannot afford to disregard the
auction. They are forced to use the auction system because of their contracts with the
insurance companies.
Business processes. Business processes in the insurance companies and the care
providers had to be changed: insurance companies had to adjust the call center process to
be able to enter individual requests into the CareAuction web application and to remove
the requests after the auctions were finished. Care providers have indicated that they
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would like to have more information per request: this would help them to decide on bids.
They also prefer that if a care request has a preferred supplier, then the request should be
allocated directly to this supplier, without being put on auction. Insurance companies
have decided that all requests must be auctioned, including request with preferences.
Billing system. Care providers who win the bid on a care request from the Achmea
insurance company have to use the online CareAuction billing system as well as their
internal billing system. Double data entry means re-keying the contract data, leading to
higher transaction costs for these care providers. The other insurance company does not
require double data entries, which indicates that higher transaction costs are due to the
Achmea decision and not to the CareAuction application.

5.3 Effects on Market Performance
Price. Fixed prices do no longer exist: CareAuction has resulted in variable prices per
care request. The prices are now 2.6% to 4.3% lower than the maximum tariff, which
used to be the standard tariff in the past (see also above).
Volume. Obviously, CareAuction has not influenced the total market size, being the
number of clients requesting maternity care (clients do not get pregnant because of
CareAuction), so the total number of care requests remains unchanged. However,
CareAuction has resulted in a significant increase of the number of auctions for maternity
care. In April 2005, 800 auctions were done. This number has increased to 1400 auctions
per month in August 2005 to January 2006. In May 2006, about 20% of all requests for
maternity care were auctioned through CareAuction, and this figure is expected to rise to
30% in 2007.
Quality. During the test period, no quality improvement of care has been found. The
insurance companies and the care providers expect quality improvement after
implementation of the customer satisfaction evaluation system.
Costs. The costs of matching care providers to care request have increased due to higher
costs of business processes in insurance companies (call center costs), higher processing
costs in care providers organizations, and the costs of CareAuction (19 euro per
transaction). However, costs of care brokers are avoided.

6 Conclusions and Recommendations
CareAuction is a new intermediary between insurance companies and maternity care
providers. The CareAuction instrument was implemented in March 2005 as a reverse
auction system in a market for a relatively simple care service (maternity care). The
auction mechanism has significantly influenced market structure, market behavior and
market performance, in particular in the market between insurance companies (that
purchase care services) and care providers (who deliver these services to consumers).
Only slight changes were found in the market between consumer and insurance company
(consumers preferences are specified in each care request, but consumers do not
experience price effects such as lower policy costs). Also, only slight changes occured in
the market between care providers and consumers (care providers suggest consumers to
indicate a preferred supplier of maternity care).
In 2006, up to 30% of all maternity care in the Netherlands was allocated on an individual
basis, in stead of based on yearly contracts. CareAuction has resulted in more competition
between care providers, more care providers bidding on care requests, more transparency,
increased power positions for the insurance companies to control care transactions, and a
slight reduction (2-4%) in the price for maternity care. 80% of the requests for maternity
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care are allocated based on preferences (preferred providers). If care would have been
allocated based on the best price, then a price reduction of about 11% would be realized.
A quality system (or customer satisfaction system) was not (yet) available in 2006, so that
it was not yet possible to allocate care to a care provider based on quality indicators.
Insurance companies and care providers prefer quick implementation of this system
because they belief that it will result in a more fair allocation of care. They also prefer
additional functionalities of the CareAuction application, such as improved management
information for providers and insurance companies, and improved linkages of the bidding
robots to the internal accounting and business systems (to reduce re-keying and double
bookings).
The case shows that the auction principle can be applied to the market for maternity care.
CareAuction in its current form has resulted in a stronger market position for the two
insurance companies that decided to use it. CaeAuction also resulted in more market
transparency for insurance companies, but not for care providers or for clients/ patients.
Further adjustments to the auction mechanism (for instance by asking the customers to
list more than one preferred supplier) might lead to more transparency for all parties,
leading to market improvements, including better prices, higher quality, and product
differentiation. We advise to investigate the application of the CareAuction principle in
other care markets for elective care (not in emergency care) with sufficiently high
volumes, sufficient care providers, and sufficient standardization of care services.
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